An Epoch-Making Change in the Development of Science? A Critique of the "Epochal-Break-Thesis" Gregor Schiemann Introduction In recent decades, several authors have claimed that an epoch-making' process of change in the development of science is currently taking place. The authors conceive the development of modern science as a continuous process that began approximately between the sixteenth and late eighteenth centuries, and that is discontinuously ending in our time. But the epochal break thereby formulated is only rarely dealt with on the conceptual level, and even then not in a uniform manner (see section "Assertions of Current Epochal Changes and the Problem of Their Conceptual Definition").! This terminological weakness makes it more ditlicult to assess the various assertions of an epochal break. What is it that lends an epoch-making character to a process of change? Is there a specific dynamic that distinguishes epochal changes from other processes of change? What is the significance of the claim of discontinuity associated with the word "break"? In what way are contemporary descriptions involved in the assertions of epoch-making changes (which might occur only at a moderate pace)? In order to be able to answer these questions, I will propose a COIIcepr 0/ epochal change that takes up the intuitions of the authors asserting such a change, but wh ich also allows for a critical assessment of these claims. According to this concept, it is typical of epochal changes that they begin within a particular subarea of the sciences, Ihal Ihey occur in a manner Ihal is al besl parlially disconlinuous Ihe concepl of an "epochal break" Iherefore appears inappropriate _ and Ihat they Iranspire over a relatively long period of time (see section "The Concept of an Epochal Change in Ihe Development of Science"). In Ihe inleresl of assessing the transformalions of conlemporary science asserted by Ihe authors in queslion, as weil as transformations that they have not taken into G. Schiemann (/81) Philosophisches Seminar. Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Wuppertal, Germany e-mail: schiemann@uni-wuppertal.de ! The term "epochal .break" is not found in all !he relevant publications. but is suitable to characterize the assertion 01' a discontinuous pmcess of epoch-making change. M. Carrier. A. Nordmann (eds.), Sdel1ce il1/he Clllllex/ fif Al'l'licllIilll1. 431 Boston Studies in the Philosophy ofScience 274.00110.1007/978-90-481-9051_5_25. © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011 G. Schiemann cnnsidcralion, Ilhink il is sensihle 10 stick to societal subsystems as aframe ofreferellce. Given Ihis prerclluisile, dilTerences between the subareas of seicnce, to which Ihc currcnt tnlllsformations refer, hecome more clear: they are correlated with different socielal suhsystems. I will take these correlations as a guideline in assessing the hislorical origins and Ihe form of progression of some transformations thai are calldidares for t"e status of (/11 epochal change (see seclion "Candidates for the Status of Epochal Transformalions in the Recent Development of Ihe Sciences"). Assertions of Current Epochal Changes and the Problem of Their Conceptual Definition The mosl reccnl asserlions of an epochal break in the sciences appeal to devel0pll1cnlullendencies Ihal have heen apparent since approximately the I 980s. They concur wilh respcci nol only 10 Iheirestimation ofthe beginning point ofthe changes hUI also to some fundamenlai elements of their characterization of the changes. The commonalilies appeal' ohove oll in the historieal demarcation 01' the new characleri7.mions. whieh are eonslilulivc of the concept of the epochal hreak. For example, the colltra.l*t to modem sciellce, as it developed up to the second half of the last century, is included in all the definitions of the transformation. Accordingly, the denominalions ol"!cn claim 10 distinguish a Iype of science that follows upon modern science. M. Gihhons el al. speak of"Mode 2", S.O. Funtowicz and R. Ravetz of"post-normal scicl1l:c". J. Ziman of "post-academic science", and P. Fonnan of the "postmodern primacy of Icchnology". [n the following, I would like to discuss some examples of Ihc co 111 111 on historieal positioning of the epochal hreak, and to show that the concepl of an cpochal hreak cannot be sustained in the cases under discussion. I will not lake Ihe conceplion of posl-academic scienee into eonsideration.2 In addition, I will draw upon the conception of the "Tri pie Helix of universily-industry-government relations". as weil as two descriptions of a fundamental transformation that do nol assen a discontinuity, 01' do so only in a qualified manner. Mode 2 Gihbons ct al. identify Mode I, which precedes Mode 2, with modern science as il goes back 10 carly ll10dern times.3 They characterize it as the "complex of 1 lohn Ziman'~ conceplion or posl-academic science is related to the conception of Mode 2: cf. Ziman (2000. 81). and Nowolny (2006). Moreover. B. Latour's and D. Haraway's conception of Icchnoscicnce will also he Icrt 10 Ihe side here. There are different variants of it. a comparative discllssion 01' which is heyond the score of this critique. which will be Iimited to dealing with rarticlIlnr cxnmples. On Latollr's and Haraway's use of the term "teehnoseience" as an epochal conception. see Reichle (2004). Weher (2003) and Ihde and Selinger (2003). . 1The Modc*2 Ihesis is rresented and eilleidated in Gibbons et al. (1994, 2003). as weil as in Nowolny CI nl. (2001). For eriticism. see Elzinga (2004). Weingart (1997) and Schiemann (2009). A Critiqlle of Ihe "Epochal-Break. Thesis" 433 ideas, methods, values and norms that has grown up to eontrol the diffusion of the Newtonian model of scienee to more and more fields of enquiry and ensure its complianee with what is eonsidered sound seientifie praetiee" (Gibbons et al., 1994, 167). They maintain that Mode 2, which arose in a diseontinuous fashion, differs "in nearly every respect" li'om Mode I (loe.eiL, VII). The former has not replaced the latter but, rat her, appeared alongside it as a distinct system. The persistence of Mode I presents an element 01' continuity that eontrasts with the idea of an epochal break. The.authors characterize the dilrerence between the two modes by appea[ing to characteristics of Mode 2 that share a eommon tendency to loster an orientation toward socially IIseful applicatiolls (loe.eiL,:I ff. and 167). While this practieal component of the current translormation of science is eommon to the various conceptions of the epochal break, jlldgments of the structural changes eonnected to it differ and are the subjeet of controversy. The Mode-2 coneeption asserts a partial dissolution 0/ the bOl/lldaries thaI previously separated the suhsystems of society (scienee, the slate. thl:! market and elilture), and gives speeial prominence to the dissolution of the separation hetwl:!en aeademie and non-aeademie production of knowledge. In place of these sl:!parations, it envisions the lormation of new, heterogeneous struetures, in whieh seienlific, technieal, economic, politieal and publie interests are taken up in multil'arioliS ways (Nowolny et al., 2001, 21 Ir. and 245).4 It is elaimed that these institulional ehanges have an impact upon the "epistemological core", which no [onger consists in "irrefutable and invariant laws" (loe. cil. 196) hut in "individual, soeial and cultllral visions of scienee" (Ioc. eil. 198).5 This lieH' cOllceptioll 0/ the epistell1ological core is taken to reveal the fundamental characler of the epochal break. There is indeed a basis lor this viewpoint, insofar as epistemologieal characteristies represent a decisive historiea[ eonstant lor seienee over a long period 01' time. I group these charaeteristics together under the label "classical cOllception of sciellce ", according to which scientific knowledge is marked by truth, generality and necessity.6 The new coneeption introduced by the notion 01' Mode 2 remains ambiguous, though, sinee it denies epistemological characteristies, claiming that the epistemological core is empty (Nowotny et al., 200 I, 225), but at the same time eontinues to grant them signifieance, as is revealed in the demand lor a new epistemology (loc. ciL 247 f.). Although the authors give partieular reasons for the beginlling of the epochal break in the I 980s (Gibbons et al., 1994, 10, [7 and 44), they also trace so me essential characteristics of Mode 2, such as the development of non-academic research and the retreal from Iraditional validity claims, hack to the nineteenth century 4For criticism of the supposed dissolulion 01' the boundaries between societal subsystems. see Section "Candidates for the Slatus of Epochal Transformations in the Recent Development of the Scienees" helow. 5This thesis is emphasized especially in Nowotny (1999): "What is currently at stake is nothing less than a new conceptualization of the epistemological core of science, and therefore also a central component of the image of science (Ioe. eit 29) . 6The cJassical conception of science was paradigmatie from antiquity until the nineteenth century. cf. Schnädelbnch (1983. 106 f.). Schiemann (2009. Chapter 2). 434 G. Schiemann (e.g., Joc. cit. 22; Nowotny et al., 200 J, 197). As an historieal claim, the epochal hreak thesis therehy hecomes questionahle. What speaks against pushing back the start 01' the transfonnative process as weil? What is the relationship between the factors that seemingly prepared the way for the supposed break and those wh ich initiated it'? Is it a matter of a more gradual or a more discontinuous change? With regard to the present state of affairs, the authors assert a mutual intluence hetween the clearly distinct forms ofknowledge production: they helieve that Mode 2 relies upon and also transforms Mode I. Not much is said ahout the continuing development of Mode I, ex ce pt that it "will become incorporated within the larger system [ ... oll Mode 2" (Gibbons et al., 1994, 154). The revolutionary transformation is therefore not yet complete, and the form of seience that will succeed upon modern science as it has existed until now cannot yet be characterized fully. Post-normal Seien ce In contrast to the conception of Mode 2, the conception of "post-normal science" espoused by Silvio O. Funtowicz and Jerome R. Ravetz distinguishes the new form of knowledge production not only from the seience that came about in early modernity.7 The authors regard this science as belonging to a type that arose in antiquity and which could appropriately be characterized by T.S. Kuhn's concept of "normal science". While they, like Kuhn, impute a one-sided theoretical orientation to normal scienee, they see in the diseontinuously arising post-normal scienee a rwofo/d rum ro praxis: to the praxis of knowledge produetion and to new õjects of this production, whieh arise in speeifie contexts of application (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993, 118 f.). These objeets an example of whieh would be the eeologieal erisis brought ahout in part hy the applieation of seientifie teehnology (Ioe. cil. 95 f.) are marked by a camp/exity which ean be only partially grasped by theory. Epistemieally, wlcerrainty is therefore a most salient characteristic ofpost-normal knowledge.8 The processing of such new objects is, in their view, marked by conflieting values and high risks, and is only põsible in direct relation to politics (loc. cil. 86 tT.). Just as Mode 2 takes over from Mode 1 its leading role, normal science is said to persist and to be substantially influenced by post-normal science (Ioc. cil. 110 f.). Henee, we again find an element of continuity that contrasts with the thesis of discontinuity. In distinguishing post-normal science from a kind of science that goes back all the way to antiquity, the authors impart to the epochal hreak a more far-reachin8 dimel/siol/ than is the case tor the Mode-2 conception. With the increased historical scope, the characterization of the rift undergoes a shift toward a greater tocus upon episremic cllOracrerisr;cs. The authors refer to the latter as constituting the "ideological function [of sciencel as the unique bearer of the True and therefore 71 am basing my prcsentation ofpost-normal science on Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993, 1994.2001). RUncertainly is also a characlerislic of knowledge in Mode 2. Cf. Ihe subtille 01" Nowolny el al. (2001): "Knowledge and Ihe Public in an Age of Uncerlainly". A Critique 01" the "'Epochal-Break-Thesis" 435 of the Good" (loc. cil. 85, cf. 95 and 111 ).9 The beginning of its destruction is dated at the beginning of the twentieth century (Gödel's incompleteness theorems, Einstein's theory of relativity, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle), and is said to have enabled the subsequent genesis of post-normal science (Ioc. eil. 93 tl".). In a fashion similar to the Mode-2 authors, the relationship between the appearance of the supposedly epochal break and the processes preceding it remains somewhat vaglle. The hreak can be understood as an emerging insight that the truth claims of the c1assieal conception cannot be realized. This insigllt has become estahlished in partieular in subareas of science occupied with certain complex ohjects. But the authors do not adequately justify their denial of the possihility that the theoretical understanding of complex objects could in the future continuously improve. 10 Even though Funtowicz and Ravetz consider modern normal science apart of the more comprehensive type, they still regard it as a historieal unit that they explicitly say began with the "scientific revolution" (Ioc. cil. 85, 117 f.). They take the impact of the caesura at the start of the early modern era to be in fact so profound that they even compare it to the break between normal and post-normal science (Ioc. eil. 117). Will this break have been the final revolution? A more practice-based and de-Iocalized seience could lose the capacity tor discontinuous change, wh ich is a typieal feature of normal science in Kuhn's sense. But the authors rightly distinguish clearly hetween the "scientific revolutions" of normal science and the revolutions that, as epochal breaks, affect the entire system of the sciences, and which cannot be ruled out for the future. Tripie Helix "Tripie Helix" is the term with which Henry Etzkowitz and Loet Leydesdortl" dub the model they propose for characterizing the /lew insritufiona/ interaCliolls among the three societal subsystems of university, industry and government. 11 Accordingly, these three distinguishable areas constitute biand tri-lateral networks and hybrid organizations (Etzkowitz and LeydesdortT, 2000, 111 f.), which in turn affect the definition as weil as the development of each subsystem, and their relations among eaeh other. Within this structure, there are communicative processes that are constantly re-organizing themselves and bringing about an endless innovative movement in wh ich all the elements are, so to speak, ahle to switch si des, and whieh is illustrated by the image of the Tripie Helix escalating ever upward. The authors helieve that the formation ofthis new structure, whieh occurred during 9The conception of science that Funtowicz and Ravelz label "'classical" is, with respecl 10 the theoretical understanding of validity, relaled to Mode I (Funlowicz und Ruvetz. 1993. 198 and 120). IOCf. the crilique in Carrier (2001.30). 11 The authors have presented and eillcidated their model in numerolls publicmions. For an introduction. see Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff ( 1998. 2000). G. Schiemann the secnnd half of the twentieth century, resulted from the inereasing importance of seientilie knowledge for ecollomic developmem. With respeet to the university, the eentral feature of the model in this context is the claim that the industrial relevance 01' knowledge led to a secolld academic revolution. During the first such revolution, whieh we are told dates back to the late nineteenth century, the universities added research to their already existing function as teaching institutions. During the second revolution, the universities have, according to these authors, added a third task, namely the production of economically useful knowledge. I would like to advance two points of eriticism against this model. The first addresses the lIisto/'ical /ocalizatioll of the beginning of the inerease in eeonomie importanee 01' scientific knowledge. Some elements of the interactions described by the model can be traced back to the nineteenth century. Struetures of the technieal universities founded at that time, for example, can be viewed as hybrids of university, government and industry. In Germany, research units at these state-financed and aeademically organized universities began to work more extensively and more elosely with industry in the I 880s. 12 The other point of criticism has to do with the insufficient consideration that is given to the general conditions and consequences 1'01' the production of knowledge in the twenty-first century that result in fact from the new relations obtaining among university, industry and government. Although these relations appear more c\early here than in other coneeptions, Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff do not adequately account for their scope. 13 Regarding the general conditions. the globalization of economie processes and the exponential development of information teehnology can be regarded as most important. As for consequences for the produetion 01' knowledge, I would point to the partial privatization and commercialization of knowledge production, as weil as to the capitalization of universities and to their management according to business prineiples, the market-oriented direction 01' research, the increase 01' competition among individual researehers and research groups, the rise in intensity of work in knowledge production, and the standardization 01' education. Insorar as Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff do address these consequences, it is in relation to the increase in communieation and networking. In doing so, they lose sight of aspects that are eonnected to the differences among the subsystems and to the critieism of the formation of the TripIe Helix dominated by ceonomic intcrests. The "second academic revolution" only transforms apart of modern science. Science remains not only distinet from other societal subsystems, but also retains its academic structure. While post-normal science presents a more extensive break than Mode 2. the sccond aeademie revolution is a comparatively more millor historical challge. Aceordingly, there is hardly any relevance given to preeise estimates of the point in time when (he Tripie Helix arose (cf. Etzkowitz, 2004). The authors in question speak of an arising evolution of the relations among university, industry and 12Manegold (1969.395 Il). and Wengenroth (2003. 242 ff.). 1.1 er. Elzinga (2004. 8 f.). A Critique of the "Epochal-Break-Thesis" 437 government instead of an epochal break (Etzkowitz and LeydesdortT, 2000, 109). Their notion of an "endless transition" implies the onset of aperiod of continuous progression. Postmodern Primacy 0/ Tee/m%gy Paul Forman 's assertion of a "postmodern primacy of technology" demonstrates that preserving the demarcations among societal subsystems within a description of the current fundamental transformation need not entail the convietion that this transformation is devoid of a diseontinuous historieal dynamie. t4 Forman believes he can show that there was a "sudden and drastic shift ca. 1980 in eultural presuppositions" coneerning the re/atiollship betweell sciellce and techn%g.\'. In Forman's view, the eultural primacy of science relative to teehnology, whieh persisted in the west for 2,000 years (Forman, 2007, 2), has been inverted within an astonishingly brief period of time. Rather than dissolving the boundary between technology and science, the transformation has brought about a new orientation of the relations between them and therefore a continuation of their distinguishability. While Forman's model comes e10se to the Tripie Helix model with respect to this distinguishability between societal subsystems, it ditl'ers in that it is restrieted to the level o[ cultural ascriptions. Forman is eoncerned with the "general discourse, of the denotative capacities of the terms 'seience' and 'technology''', tor whieh the "actual, faetual relationship between science and teehnology is relatively unimportant" (loc. cit. 4 and 6), whereas Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff deal with real structural changes. In focusing on eultural aseriptions, Forman is seeking to do justice to the comprelIef/sive character of the epochal break he postulates a eonneetion that is similar to the relation between historieal seope and epistemie eharaeteristies in the eonceptions of Mode 2 and post-normal science. With the onset of the modern era, whieh preeeded postmodernity, the concept of science that arose in antiquity ca me to an end. Forman ascribes to science and technology each a meaning in whieh it is speeific to an individual epoch as weil as a meaning that is constant thmllgllottf lIistOl:v. Aceording to the latter, "science" signifies conceptions of the world, while "technology" refers to things that would also exist independently of our eonceptions (Ioc. eil. 10). As a further historieal constant, Forman implies also that seience is coneentrated upon the processing of means, whereas technology aims to achieve ends (Ioe. cit. 3 and 71). In the modern era, the eoneept of science took on the historieally specific character of"pure scienee" serving the "disinterested pursuit oftruth" (loe. cil. 43, cf. 12 f.). Forman 's conception of modernity is similaI' to the notion of a e1assieal eoneeption that we encountered in the discussions of Mode 2 and post-normal scienee. Because of its subordinate status within this eoneeption, technology was 14For a presentation and discussion 01' Forman's thesis. see. above all, Fommn et al. (2007). G. Schiemann arparently at risk 01' losing its independent conceptual definitions. It was not until the postmodern valorizariOiI ofrecllllology, wh ich Forman, invoking the historieally cnnstant distinction between means and ends, dubs a "pragmatic-utilitarian subordination 01' mcans 10 ends" (loc. cil. 2), that the specific characteristics 01' technology Cllmc clcarly to light. Fnrman's concept of technology, however, remains quite gent!1'll1 und indeed vaguc. Technology, for him, is "simply the collective noun for all the muny ways Ihings are in fact done and made" (loc. cit. 10). Such a broad definition dnes not distinguish belween everyday practiees and industrial technology, which is Formun 's chief concern. Moreover, it has an ahistorieal character that runs counter 10 Ihe Ihesis 01' a Iransförmalion 01' science. 15 In Forman's defence, though, one may note thn! the bn:adth 01' the definition is no accident. Ruther, it is intended to do jllslice to the epoch-muking content ofthe transformation. AI any rate, according to Forman's constrllal 01' the clliturul discolIrse, postmodern science accords primacy to Ihenry-independent practice, wh ich is neutral with respeci to specific societal inlerests. Thc counlless pieces 01' evidence with wh ich Forman seeks to substantiate the Iwo primucy-relations reveal Ihat he thinks 01' the concepts of science and technology us persistently opposing coordinates during the epochal transition. But it is questionable whelher the relalions among interpretational patterns, which have cxisled 1'01' ccnturies as basic detlnitions, can really undergo a radieal shift in a comparalively brief period of time. While in Forman's description the purarively abl'llpr 1/,{//I.I'ilio/l from modernity 10 postmodernity is quite clear, the causes of this caesura rt!main unclcar. The "cultural revolt of the I 960s", wh ich Forman cites as the cultural source 01' the reversal 01' primacy relations between science and technology, cannot in itself be regarded as suftlcient, since it occurred 20 years before the beginning 01' thc epochal break, and Forman gives no reasons to explain its supposedly dclayed impact (Ioe. eil. 5). Moreover, one would have to inquire into the causes 01' this event as well. 16 An llsserlion 01' an epoch-making change that is confined to cultural interpretive ralterns is not rlausible. Changes in the development 01' these patterns are indeed significant, but they constitute not sufficient conditions for epoch-making new conceptions 01' the sciences. Such new conceptions are comprehensive in the sense Ihat they include various dimensions ofknowledge production: its institutional slrUClures, interactions with other soeietal systems, methods, theories and practical procedures, as weil as related cultural interpretive patterns. /5 Klinc (2007) mnkes a similnr urgument against Porman 's concept 01' technology. /6Porman regards the "demand tor 'relevance' of science" (Porman. 20tl7. 5) as an aspect of the "cuhural revoh ()f Ihe 1960s" that helped prepare the way for the epochal break. He could have poinled 10 Ihe "finnliznlion-thcory" as an cxample of this. but he assigns this theory to mOdernity in his sense (loe. eil. 47). Weingart, however. has shown that it, like Mode 2, is directed toward the cOlltext 01' applielltion. A Critique of the "Epochal-Break-Thesis" 439 Second Modemity and Kllowledge Society Some 01' lhe prerequisites to the concept of an epochal transformation can also be encounlered in descriptions of current fundamental changes in the sciences that do nol claim a discontinuity, or do so only in a qualified manner. Such descriptions are well-suiled to characterize Ihe constitutive elements of an epoch and of a possible transformation within this framework. The cOllceprioll ofrhe "secolld modemiry" is a paradigmalie example of this. Its proponents speak ofa profound "structural transformation ofthe system ofscience", brought abOltl by the "displacement of the primacy 01' renection to reflexivity". At the same time, they emphasize that there is "no complete break in the process of modernization" (Beck and Lau, 2004, 20 and 183).17 In the second half 01' the twentieth century, they say, a process !legan in the sciences as weil as in other societal subsystems and in the relations among them, by whieh the hitherto dominant reflective form 01' rationality itself !lecame the õject of reflection, and thereby entered into the state of rellexivity. The partial discontinuity connected with this change is understood with reference to the distinction between basic principles and basic institutions. The lalter are "inslitutional solutions" that aim in different ways to realize the guidelines implied by the former. It is only these institutional solutions and not the basic principles that are undergoing a discontinuous transformation. In other words, modernity is marked by a set of principles that have in themselves remained constanl, but whieh have been undersrood differently during the different developmental phases they have gone through so far namely, during the first and the second modernity, the latter having arisen in the second half of the twentieth century. One example has to do with the institutional role of the sciences in the discourse concerning the orientational function of the distinction between nature and society. While the determination 01' this distinction "in the first modernity clearly counts among the tasks 01' science, this demarcation and its justification are pluralized in the second modernity" by the influence of other institutions, civil society, the state and the market (Ioc. cil. 21, cf. 65 ff.). If one accepts the theory of the second modernity, Ihe transformarion 01' basic principles would constitute a sufficient condilion for an epochal break. To name another example of a claim of continuity, the theory of knowledge sociery descri!les new components of the order of knowledge, which consist above all in lhe "increase of practieal relevance of seience" for society, but do not present "a fundamental or qualitative break" with the order of knowledge existing since early modern times (Weingart et al., 2007, 33). The continuities claimed by this theory are more far-reaching than those claimed by the proponents of the notion of the second modernity. They are not limited to general conditions that are related to the basic principles of the second modernity (e.g., epistemic orientation, ideologieal neutrality 01' research) in lheir fllndamenlally guiding function. Rather, they also include 17Programmatie presentlllions ofthis view are found in: Beck and Bonss (2001) and Beck and Lau (2004). 440 G. Schiemann institutional facts. such as the system 01' the disciplines (loc. eil. 41 tT. and 182 ff.) and the distinction hetween hasic and application-oriented research (1oc. eil. 31 ff. and 97 1'1'.). It is an open question wh at kind 01' dissolution 01' the continuity would lead to a new order of knowledge and whether the estahlishment of such a new order would constitute an epoch-making event. The Concept of an Epochal Change in the Development ofScience With the exception of Forman's conception of postmodern science, the aforementioned characterizations 01' current fundamental changes in the development of science make claims that are not limited to a transformation of cultural interpretive patterns. For the most part, they start out from investigations within soei%g)' (If sciellce dealing with structural changes in the institutional constitution 01' the scientific prodllction 01' knowledge, and derive transformations of the epistemological characterizations of scientific knowledge. The depth of the transformation, according to the conceptions 01' Mode 2 and post-normal science, is precisely ressected in the scope of the hreakdown 01' c1assical epistemological characterizations of the sciences. It is worth noting, however, that this breakdown is also taken up in Forman's conception. Having surveyed various claims of an epochal break, it is apparent that the changes that are under discussion are, as a general rule, presently in a begillllillg stage, and are focused on a subarea ofthe seien ces. The authors tend to anticipate that the emerging new characteristics will in rhe /ong run take on a leading role in the sciences. Hence, Mode 2 and post-normal science are said to establish themselves alongside their predecessors and, without undermining a continued relevance 01' these predecessors, to stake a claim upon the guiding function that has until now belonged to them. The Tripie Helix model starts out from a particular sphere of knowledge production, namely the areas that produce economically useful knowledge. Forman's thesis can also be understood as relating to a restricted beginning 01' a more comprehensive process. The epochal change is initially limited to a (former) subarea 01' science, namely technology, and its cultural interpretive patterns. Subsequently, the change could progress to other subareas and no longer be limited to the cliitural dimensions of science. My definition of the cOllcept of all epochal change in the de\lelopmenr of seience refers in a twofold sense to the aforementioned claims. It takes up the relationship hetween suhareas and the entirety of science (Section a) and seeks to do justice to the possihle long-term character of the transformations under discussion (Section b). Moreover, the concept I am proposing incorporates conditions for the description of an epochal change (Section cl. Alongside the current changes that I have been discussing, a further point of reference for the treatment of these three issues is presented by the early modern beginnings of modern science, the epoch-making character 01' wh ich is largely uncontroversial in the literature on the history of A Critique 01' the "Epochal-Break-Thesis" 441 science. 18 The concept of an epochaf change is specific, since it refers toparticular historical events and seeks to descriptively characterize their commol1 features. 19 (a) Epochal challges begin in a subarea of science alld proceed to trollS farm the entire system ofthe seien ces. They are comprehensive, since they change the concept of science and affect various (cultural, societal, institutional, theoretic, practical) dimensions of scientific activity. The term "subarea 01' science" is intended to pick outthe restricted character 01' the beginning of epochal changes. The restriction can refer to certain disciplines, theoretical or methodical aspects, ohjects 01' inquiry, 01' relations to other subsystems.20 Epochal changes that affect the entire system 01' the sciences from the outset may be imaginable, but they are as yet unknown in the history 01' science. I would like to discuss this part 01' the definition using the example 01' the ear/y modern epochal transformation. It took its departure within a subarea, nalllely within certain physical disciplines (above all astronolllY, mechanics and optics). which subsequently rose to becollle the very paradiglll 01' scientific sOllndness.21 Alllong the new elements incorporated in the concept 01' physical science were Ihe transformed understandings of the relations obtaining between nature and technology, physics and mathematics, experience and theory, as weil as the invention 01' the experimental method. While these new elements were only partially applied to concepts of science in other disciplines, the concept 01' physics, on the other hand, was still compelled to make reference to existing criteria, which stelllllled from the c1assical conception of science and were valid for other disciplines as weil. The specific nature of this mutual interaction is crucial for determining whether the transformation is of an epochal nature. Hence, referring to the restricted score of the transformation which began in physics could lead to an argument against regarding it as epoch-making. Did the early modern transformation 01' physics not lead more to a dissolution of the systematic connectedness of the sciences than to an upheaval of the system 01' the sciences? One might recall in this context the early modern formation 01' dichotomies, for which the conception 01' the two cultures has been described as an ideal-type. But, contrary to this line 01' thought, one could object ISFor an overview of the literature on the history 01' science concerning the early modern Iransformation. see Cohen (1985), Cohen (1994) and Shapin (1998). The genesis of modern science can be seen as pan of an epochal change that also affected other societal subsystems _ an assumption wh ich can hardly be regarded as controversinl either. Skalweit (1982) gives a presentalion of Ihis broader process that is still well-regarded today. 19 1 am borrowing this characteristic from Cohen (1994, 21), where it is applied 10 the concepl 01' the scientific revolution in early modern times. in contrast to the concept of scientific revollllions introduced by T.S. Kuhn as a general structurnl feature of scientific development. 20These possibilities are intended to do justice 10 the aforementioned conceptions of a Cllrrenl epochal change as weil to reconstructions 01' the early modern epochal change. 21That the early modern epochal change was initially restricted to cerlnin subareas of physics is a view thnt has not unlil recently become eSlnblished in the liternture on the history of science. In the middle of the twentieth century, the influential studies by Butterfieid (1949) and Hall (1954) assumed that the epochal change affected the entire system of the sciences from the very outset. For a critique of this view. see Cohen (1994. 121 ff.). and Shapin (1998.80 ff.). 442 G. Schiemann Ihal Ihe l11elhods of disdplines that were sil11i1ar to today's humanities also underwent a profound change in the wake of the early modern epochal transformation, and therehy rel11ained integrated in the system of the sciences. In particular, the valorization of experience vis-a-vis theory, which was initiated by this transformation, ulso made its way into the concept of science in these other discip/ines. Epochal transformations presuppose the existence of a system 01 the sciences and lead to its rc-orientation or vitiation. With the dissolution of the system of the sciences. as it is assllmed in connection with the irreducible heterogeneity of the sciences in the conception of Mode-2 or post-normal science, the. concept of an epochal change in the development of science itself runs up against a limit. But, as long as this is not the case, epochal changes in the development of science are distinct from fundamental changes within a disciplille or a group 01 disciplilles. The latter do not have the comprehensive character of the former. Although they can cffectuate the ahandonment of epistemological prerequisites and the introduction of new elementary assumptions, they can not force the identity of the entire movement to an end.22 This identity, which is set out in the very concept of science, is precisely the ohject of epochal changes in the system of the sciences. (h) The fact that epochal changes consist in the unfolding of the influence of one suharea upon other areas of science has consequences for the spectrum of possinle dynamics of these changes. Much 10llger periods 01 firne can be necessary for the spread of new conceptions throughout the system of the sciences than for the appearance of fundamental changes in a subarea. In particular, the progression 01' an epochal change need not be entirely discontinuous. I would therefore Iike to l/I'oid commiftil/g to a specific lorm 01 progression ill lormulafing fhe concepf 01 an epochal chal/ge. One also finds arguments in favor of this kind of openness in the aforementioned descriplions of recent epochal changes. They only claim a discontinuous appearance 01' new conceptions with respect to individual subareas. not to the preceding genesis of the conditions for new forms of knowledge. Since these processes cannot be distinguished c1early from the genesis of the new conceptions, it is advisable to incorporate their element of continuity in the concept of an epochal change. Another reason t()r including the gradual form of progression is the fact that the descriptions I have heen discussing have yet to demonstrate a break in the transformation of the emire system of the sciences. Indeed, older forms ofknowledge such as Mode I or normal science are integrated into the system and assure an element of continuity. Moreover, the transformation 01' the entire system has generally not advanced far enough that the form of its progression could conclusively be judged. 23 Against this hackdrop, the use of the term "epochal break" appears problematic. It would only 22Blumcnberg (1976. 16). and Footnote 19. 2.1Thal goes for the assessment of the epochal nature of a change, not just for its form of progression: Cf. thc lhird pan of the definition of the concept of an epochal change. wh ich follows helow. A Critique of the "Epochal-Break-Thesis" 443 be justified if the entire impact of an initialing event upon the system of the sciences were of a discontinuous nature. Finally, the fact that one need not conceive of the progression of an epochal change as discontinuous is demonstrated by historians' reception of the early modern epochal transformation. In general, a discontinuous form of progression is not ascribed to the transformation of early modern physics or to its consequences for the other areas of science.24 (c) For cotlfemporaries. epochal challges ill the developmellt 01 rhe sciences might be observable ollly fo a limited extellt. The concept refers to observations 01' individual events, which can only be attributed an epochal character once Ihey have been brought into connection with a presumably comprehensive transformation.25 Insofar as the epochal character depends upon the consequences of new conceptions upon the entire system of the sciences, it can only be evaluated once these consequences have reached a certain stage of development. If the epochal changes are spread out over a long period of time, it can be problematic for contemporaries to observe them. The transformation can proceed so slowly that its epochal character cannot be inferred in an unqualified sense.26 Epoch-making transformations in the production of scientific knowledge go hand in hand with observable structural changes, but also include the appearance of new patterns of interpretation, which evaliJate states of affairs in novel ways and are incorporated in the description of the structural changes. This 1I0rmative elemem makes its way into the conceptions under discussion as weil. These conceptions ascribe great importance to the changes they describe and call for support as the paradigmatic title "Re-Thinking Science" iIIustrates (Nowotny et al., 200 I) for the completion of the transformational process. Their descriptions, which are meant to refer to a desirable concept of science that so far only applies to certain branches of science, are understood as part of the transition (cf. loc. cit., 64, 168, 180, 184 and 192). Hence, observers of epoch-making transformational processes not only bear witness to but are also potential creators of these processes. In order to do justice to the relations obtaining between descriptive and normative elements of the concept of an epochal change, it is advisable to include in the concept the cOllditiollslor wirnessillg it. A good point to set out from in this direction is 1.8. Cohen's distinction 24Cohen (1994. 147 ff.). discusses the relationship bctwcen continuous and discontinuous eIe* ments: Shapin (1998) denies that the entire bcginning of early modern science had a revolutionary character: Cohen (1985). on the other hand. ascribcs just such a character to this episode in the history of science. 25The conditions for observability of a transformation include not only objective conditions that cannot bc influenced but also subjective conditions. The laUer are discussed in Nordmann (2008). The two. taken together. nllow the ohservation of a transformation only when there is n suitable distance between the epistemic subject and its object. 2611hink Blumenberg goes too far with his claim Ihat there can in principle be no witnesses to such events since epochal changes proceed at a slow pace (Blumenbcrg. 1976.20). But one must agree with hirn when he Claims that an epochal change can hnve a discontinuous progression even if it proceeds too slowly to bc observed. 4-14 G. Schiemann 01' fOllr Iypes 01' ooservulions 01' scientitic events: I. The "judgment of scientists and nOIl-Scienlisls" [01' lhe period in question ... ,2. the] examination 01' the later docuIlH.:nlnry history 01' the suhject [ ... ,3.] the judgment 01' competent historians [ ... and 4.11he general opinions of working scientists in the field today (Cohen, 1985,41 Ff.). Cohen npplies these types "quite generally to all of the more significant scientific evenlS 01' the last four centuries", and thel'ehy also to fundamental changes within a discipline as weil as to changes that elTect the entire system of the sciences (Ioc. eit. 401'.). The latter kind of change is exemplified hy the early modern scientific change Ooc. cil. 77 11'.). He refers to his types as tests for assessing whether a fundamental change occul'l'ed in a discontinuous fashion. They can also he invoked to determine whelher a given change is 01' an epochal nature. The presence of an epoch-making change should he corrohorated hy all four types. The ahsence of one of the types would call I'or specialjustification. Applied 111 the claims of a current epochal transformation, the first and fourth Iype pal'tly coJlnpse into one another, while the second and third are only availahle in a lirniled sense. Regarding the third type, the judgment of competent historians, Cohen rnenlions only exarnples of presentations that appeared long after the relevanl events (loc. cil. 43). But there is no reason why one could not also look at conternporary presentations. To a cel'tain extent, current descriptions heing offered hy sociologisls 01' science, which I would classify as helonging to type I or 4, overlap wilh historicnl studicsY In general, though, the question whether epoch-making changes in science nre currently taking place is not a central LOpic in the literature on the hislory of science.28 11/ I11I1I/I1ar\'. we can hold on to certain features 01' the concept 01' an epoch-making change: it is ~ matter 01' 1I comprehensive, not necessarily discontinuous, transformalion 01' science. which starts in a suharea of science and spreads from there. Epoch-rnuking changes lead to new concepts of science. They must be attested 10 in various ways, and can only be evaluated satisfactorily when the interactions hel ween the subarea and the entirety of science have suflieiently taken shape. Insofar as the phenomena invoked in current descriptions 01' epoch-making changes have not yel affected the entire system of the sciences, these claims take on a hypotltetic(li ch(lmCler. The discontinuity-claim in these descriptions refers only to a subarea nl' scicncc and can only he demonstrated for this subarea. In other words, current ohservers lack the requisite distance to be able to assess conclusively wh ether a disconlillllouS forrn of progression and an epoch-making character can be ascrihed to a process comprehending the entire system of the sciences. 27Hisrorically oriented arguments are given nbove nll by P. Porman. ns weil as B. Latour and D. Haraway in their conceptions of technoscience. 2Rln the historiography of science. people do not speak as much of an epochal hreak in current science as they do of certain recent transfomlations in the historienl description of science (e.g. the experimental. rracticnl and culturalturns). cf. Hagner (2001). A Critique of the "Epochal-Break-Thesis" Candidates for the Status of Epochal Transformations in the Recent Development of the Sciences 445 It is characteristic of the subareas of science to wh ich the aforementioned claims 01' an epochal transformation refer that they are correlated witf! other societal subsystems. This commonality expresses the orientation toward praxis that is typical of the current transtormational process in general. Mode-2 science is connected in. the context of application to various societal subsystems (technology, industry, the state, the public, culture, etc.); post-normal science is policy-related research; in the Tripie Helix model, the significance of the relationships obtaining among science, the state and industry is rellected in the tille of the conception; Forman's thesis pi aces the relationships hetween seienee and teehnology at center-stage. Regarding the areas of physics from which the early modern epochal transformation took its departure, one Cljn also establish the mark of an orientation toward practical contexts. Astronomy, mechanics and opties, for example, were closely tied to technical traditions 01' craftsmanship, which were of fundamental importance in developing experimental science. Although the transtormational processes in science cannot be fully grasped simply by appealing to their relations to other societal subsystems, and although multifarious internal conditions also played a constitutive role, these relations are nevertheless he/pIIII guidelines in investigating the possible epoch-making character of the cutTent changes in science. In order to make use 01' this orientational function, I would first Iike to c1arify the extent to wh ich the structure of societal subsystems is itself the object 01' a fundamental transformation. Do the traditional or modern classijicatiolls of these subsystems still present a suitable basis for describing the interaction of society and science? As I have already mentioned, the authors of Mode 2 believe that they can demonstrate "the erosion of modernity's stable categorizations states, markets and cultures" (Nowotny et al., 200 1,245). The context of application has, in their view, taken the place 01' apart of the previously existing structure of interactions between science and society. But they themselves are not fully able to make good on the claim 01' a dissolution of the demarcations. Science and society remain separate insofar as their transformation is described as a "co-evolutionary" process (Ioe. cil. 30 fl'.). The state, the market and culture have not so much fundamentaJly declined as categories but instead have hecome invested with new definitions (Ioc. eit. 22 1'1'.). Other conceptions 01' arecent epoch-making translormation appealin my view, rightly to the categories 01' modernity in characterizing the changes they observe. That is obviously true of the Tripie Helix, the postmodern primacy of technology and the knowledge society.29 It is less obvious for post-normal science and for second modernity. The conception of post-normal science describes border infractions hetween science and neighboring subsystems, wh ich hears a certain resemblance 29 The conception of the knowledge society separates the production of knowledge from the areas of politics. economics. the media.the law and technology (Weingart et al.. 2007. 13 ff.). 446 G. Schiemann to Mode 2. JO But it remains focused on a new concept 01' science that does not significantly affect the traditional definitions of technology, industry, politics and the puhlic:~1 These definitions are still not given up by proponents of the second modernity either; rather, they lose their uniform character and are pluralized in ways depending on ditl'erent discourses and decision procedures. 11' one difl'erentiates the current transformational processes in science according to the soeietal subsystems to which they relate, differences in the respective historical origillS of the processes appear. In the following, I will be guided by an ideal-type schema, wh ich takes up not only the changes addressed hy the conceptions I have been discussing, but also changes not taken into consideration within these conceptions. My account groups the soeietal relations of science into the areas of tee/lIIolog)" illdustry, the stare anu the public. Science alld Teclmology The relationship between science and technology that is largely constitutive of today's concept of science can be traced back to the early modem epochal transformation. Among its essential achievements is the insight that technology, just like *nature. can be made an object of scientific investigation. Looking at the ensuing relationship between science and technology, people have labeled these two societal subsystems twins. J2 The characterization of the current relations obtaining between science and technology as "technoscience" can also be traced back to early modern times. J3 Forman's thesis, according to which technology has won primacy over science, does not have an epochal dimension insofar as it is Iimited to cultural interpretive patterns. It does however take on certain aspects 01' a transformed concept of science, wh ich indeed can be regarded as aspects of a possible future epochal transformation. In Forman 's view, science, given the primacy of technology, is no longer 'governed by the epistemological goal 01' truth or by methodological provisions, but by pragmatically established ends. To put it succinctly, truth becomes a means to technical ends. This kind of pragmatism has not been established within the currently dominant eoncept 01' seienee.34 Furthermore, one must bear in mind that the JOFor exnmple. Funlowicz nnd Rnvelz (1990,752 f.), cf. Elzinga (2004. 10). .11 Cf. FlInlowicz and Ravelz ( 1993), in which technology, cuhure and science are separnted early on (Ioc. cil. 85): while science is distinguished from policy (Ioc. cit. 87 and 90 ff.) and professional consuhancy (Ioc. eil. 96 t1.) and hrought into relation wilh Ihe puhlic (Ioc. cil. 109 f.). .12 Jacob (1997. 9). Laylon (197 I). cf. Wegenrolh (2003. 230 and 244). .1.1Carrier (2008) . . 14 1n dctermining Ihe currenl concepl of science. one can refer 10 Ihe types of observalion skelched by I.B. Cohen (cf. ~eclion "The Concept of an Epochal Change in Ihe Development of Seience" above). ahove all to Ihe jlldgmenl of seientists. incJuding philosophers of science. Representative presenlalions Ihat discuss Ihe concept of science are offered by Barteis and Slöckler (2007), Schurz (2006) and Carrier (2006). A Critique of the "Epochal-ßreak-Thesis" 447 relation to technology only marginally determines the concept of science in some disciplines, such as literary theory, history and religious studies. Science, Ihe State and Illdustry The formation of the current struetural relations among science, the state and industry begall in the nineteellth century. Seientific knowledge, at that time, was systematically built into large-scale industrial production-processes (above al1 ehemistry and electrical engineering). The state founded the organization 01' the professional education 01' young scientific and technical researchers, and began the massive funding 01' experimental research. State institutions regulated the use 01' scientifie and industrial technology. As I have argued elsewhere, the formation 01' the relations among science, the state and industry were c10sely tied to criticism and relativization of the meaning of the c1assical features of seience. The classical coneeption lost its previous validity earlier than is supposed by current assertions of an epochal break. 35 In a nutshell, one could say that the real epistemic insight in science in the nineteenth century was the discovery that science can be socially quite useful even if epistemological questions, wh ich had the highest priority in the classieal eonception, were left unanswered. In my view, though, it is not yet possible to determine whether the transformational process in science, which goes hand in hand with the formation 01' relations among scienee, the state and industry, can be considered in its own right an epoch-making transformation of science. It appears not yet to Oe elear whether the orientation of science toward the realization of its potential soeial 01' economical utility might in fact be a continuation ojthe early modem relationship between science and technology. One point that speaks against this possibility is the connecti on that exists between the formation of the relations among the three subsystems and the critieism 01' the classical conception of science that was paradigmatic from antiquity until the nineteenth century. The loss of validity 01' the c1assical conception points back to an epoch-making dimension 01' the transformational pl'ocess at work in seience in the nineteenth century. It is worth asking, though, whether the consequences 01' this process upon the system 01' knowledge reacl! all the wa.\' into the present and therefore cannot yet be regarded as a completed developmenl. Hence, so me features of scienee that are demonstrated by the Tripie Helix model, tor exampie, ean be understood as consequences of the relations that were brought about in the nineteenth century.36 Moreover, the discussion over the c1assical conception has persisted into the presenl. Some tendeneies of the debate suggest a renaissance of this conception of seience among them, tor example, would be Positivism, whieh restricts seientific knowledge to observable phenomena, Pragmatism, which del'ives 35Cf. Schiemann (1995. 2008, 2009). 36See ahove. seclion "Tripie Helix". 448 O. Schiemann truth from the success of seientific theories, and Scientific Realism, according 10 which scientific knowledge gradually approaches the !ruth. It would constitute a new, perhaps epoch-making constellation in the context of the relations among science, the state and industry, if one ofthe subsystems involved were to take over the leadership and if its boundary to science were to be vitiated. Some of the phenomena under discussion such as privatization, commercialization, and commodification of knowledge production suggest that the economic intluence arising trom industry could attain primacy. Sciellce alld the Public Domaill The relationship between science and the public domain has come to the center of intercst in recent years in disciplines reflecting upon science.37 Tbe current attention could have to do with a transformation that in particular Mode 2 describes. At the center of the new structures that are taking shape, in wh ich scientific, technical, economic and political forces co me together in various ways, the authors of Mode 2 place the so-called "agora". The agora is conceived as the space of an informed puhlic. highly influenced by the media, which demands soeially useful knowledge from science, and before which science presents and sometimes justifies its activities. The public domain and science not only act upon each other, but also face each other as different discourse systems. In this constellation, which goes back to the second half of the twentieth century, we can perhaps see a re-organization or even areversal oJthe previous relationship benl'een science ano sociery. Early modern science was initially an elitist endeavor, wh ich was only accountable to itself (cf. the "House of Solomon" in Francis Bacon 's "New Atlantis"). Through the formation of the relations obtaining among seience, industry and the state, the institutional autonomy of science was restricted in the nineteenth century, but the definitional power which shielded it from external crilicism was not. On the contrary, scientific knowledge enjoyed a great reputation.38 It was nol unlil the pluralization of knowledge in the twentieth century, as described in the theory ofthe second modernity, that the presently typical acknowledgment of the equal validity of various kinds of knowledge came about. Through this process, scientilic methods and projects became disputable objects of public debate. The discussion of the soeial utility of scienlific knowledge that arose in this context look shape, as various authors have noted, in 'such abrief period that it does not . 17 For the hi~tory and philosophy of science, this widespread interest is reflected in the numerous cnlries Oll "science and Ihe public domain" in retevant databases for journal articles. For the history 01' science. Ihat would he. for example. "Eureka", organized by the History of Science Society, and tor Ihe philosophy 01' science. "The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007". For sociology of science, cf. Weingart (2005). JRCf. Daum (1998). A Critique of the "Epochal-Break-Thesis" 449 seem far-fetched 10 speak of a discontinuity.39 Tbis beginning phase can be characterized with reference to the issues of depletion of natural resources (beginning the 1970s with the oil crisis and the movement against nuclear energy) and _ closely connected with this the destruction of the natural environment (espeeially in the context of the discussion of c1imate change since the 1980s).40 Tbe focal points of debates up until now reveal that exisrellfial qllesriol/S Jor humaniry constitute an important impulse for public interest in seientific .knowledge. It is not only the hope ~f a solut~on ~o existing life-threatening problems, but also the fear that the applicatlOn of sClenltfic knowledge could threaten the foundations of human existence, that leads non-scientislS to participate in the public discourse on science.41 It is indeed only since the previous century that scientific technology has the (epoch-making new) potential to threaten the continuance of human life at agiobai level. It has made possible planned and irreversible transformations of nature, which could to a large extent destroy the conditions of life on earth.42 The paradigmatic example of the qualitatively higher-order means of intervention is the scientifically constructed potential for destruction by means of milital)' weapol/I)', which could undermine the further existence of the human speeies with one stroke. Insofar as science is among the societal subsystems that have participated in the construction and the implementation of this potential for violence, Ihe relalionship between science and the public domain is still asymmetrical. Public discourse offers the opporlunity to counteract this asymmetry. In wh at way could public discourse contribute to a re-organization of the relationship between science and society, such that the concept of science would thereby be changed? Inslead of discussing this far-reaching question here, I would like to limil myself to referring 10 two approaches 10 bringing to light the possibility of a transformation of our understanding of science by way of the public discourse. The firsl approach is presented by parriciparory models, in which the individuals affected hy a lilIe ofresearch are involved in the production and application ofrelevant scientific knowledge. Tbe participation of the affected individuals has an influence, in turn, upon the structure of the production and application of knowledge exactly when the participation is mediated by the public domain, as is paradigmatically iIIustraled by the formation of "recursive learning processes" in the so-called "real world experiments".4J On the other hand, public discourse can contribute to the choice of goals for the application of scientific knowledge and 10 the transformation of the ethical attitudes of seientists. These potentialities of the relations between science and the public domain can be observed in the case of Janet Kourany's program of sociall.\' 39Beck (1986, 254 ff.). Funtowitz and Ravetz (1993,109 f. und 1(7). 4ONowotny et al. (2001.15 ff.), Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993. 95 and 110 ff.) . 4tCf. Office ofScience and Technology and Wellcome Trust (2000). EU-Kommission (2001). 42From among the conceptions that I have been discussing, it is especially the second modernity that addresses the "irreversible endangerment of the life of plants, animals and humans" (Beck. 1986, (7). . 430ross et al. (2005). 450 O. Schiemann ellgaged (lIId respomible sciellce.44 In this context, puhlic discourse is a forum in which nnn-episiemic values involved in knowledge are formulated, demands for the prnduclion 01' socially relevant knowledge are made, and seientists re port on the ulility of their resulls. In order 10 he el'Rcacious, though, the relationship hetween Ihe public domain und science would have to he incorporated in the institutional siructure 01' science. Conclusion The epochal-breuk-thesis is hased on veriRahle, prohahly quite far-reaching, changes that have rccently heen occurring in the production 01' knowIedge and in nur undcrstanding of what it means to he scientiRc at agiohai level. hut especially in Ihe developed industrial countries. On the whole, there are enough phenomena In make it appeal' not implausihle to think of a fundamental transformation, perhaps even nl' an epoch-making discontinuity in the development 01' science. SeientiRc nhjects. I'nr example. have attained to new levels of complexity; they permeate ever more areas of Iife; on Ihe nther hand, science, hy heing suhjected to economization and tn puhlic criticism. is losing the autonomous status that it has enjoyed since nnliquity. Ncvcrtheless. there are suhstantial reasons that speak against the claims of a current epochal hreak. The prerequisite of my critieism is a more preeise concept of an epnch-making transformation than is currently in use. The concept I propose takes up Ihe relations ohtaining hetween, on the one hand, the suhareas from which new conceptualizations of science emerge, and on the other hand, the entirety 01' science. In which the concept of an epoch-making transformation is applied. It also incorpnrales the conditions 01' ohservahility of transformational processes. Applied 10 the current changes UI issue, it hecomes apparent that some 01' them do indeed have an epoch-making character, hut that they have historically earlier origins. Other chullgcs are so recent thai it is not yet possihle to tell whether they have an epochIlluking churacter. In part, the current changes involve discontinuous factors, hut Ihcre arc also opposing indices pointing to the far-reaching influence of continuous elements in the development of science. Hellce. il is difficult to attain a cnmprehensive overview of the situation. The convoluted. even contradietory, relations can at least he regarded as possible signs of a transl'onnation of the whole system 01' the sciences. At present, there are different conjectures that can he made ahout the future deveIopment. I have grouped together somc hypotheses ahoutlhis development according to the relations hetween science lind olher suhsystems. Roughly, the results can be summarized in two conclusions. FirsT. the relations ohtuining among science, technology, the state und industry can 44 KOllrany (2003) formulates Ihis program. which refers to science as a whole. with the help of the example of philosophy of science. The public dimension is introduced through the reference 10 the feminisl crilique of science. which she develops throughollt. A Critiqlle 01' the "Epochal-Break-Thesis" 451 essentially he traced hack to the nineteenth century or to earlier phases of modernilY* Fundamental re-conceptualizations could come about in these contexts if one of the non-scientiRc suhsystems were to take over a position of priority vis-a-vis science. Fonnun assurnes that this has al ready taken place for technology. The conception nf the Tripie Helix addresses phenomena that suggest that an economic interest emerging from industry could assurne primacy vis-a-vis science. Secondlv. certain aspects 01' the current puhlic discourse on science do not have a compar~- bly early historieal origin. Although the sciences have been an ohject in the puhlie domain since the heginning of modern times, the ways of understanding science that have heen formulated in Ihis discourse since the twentieth century cannot he reduced to those origins. In their soeial orientation, the viewpoints presented in the puhlie domain stand in contrast to economic interests. Hence, it seems that divergent directions are open to the further progression of the transformational process of seience. References Bnrtels. A .. and M. Stöckler. 2007. Wissetlscha!lSIheorie: eill Studiellbucll. Pnderborn: Mentis. Beck. U .. and C. Lau (eds.). 2004. ElIIgrelll,lmg ulld ElIIscheidwlg: was istlleu all der Theorie I'l'j/e.l'i,*er Modemisienmg? Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Beck. U .. and W. Bonss (eds.). 2001. Die Moderni.rierullg der Modeme. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Beck. U. 1986. Ri.'ikoge .. ell.,chaft: at!f dem Weg ill eille alldere Modeme. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Blumenberg. H. 1976. Aspekte der ET>odlellscilwelle: Cu.wller ulld No/aller. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. BIIUerfield. H. 1949. The Origi/l.' (!f Modem Sciellce: /300-/800. London: Bell. Carrier. M. 2001. Business as usual: On the prospects of normality in scientific research. In IIII"rdisdplillarity ill Tee/m%g)' Asse.wnellt. Imp/emelllatirm alld it .. cJrallces alld limit.'. ed. M. Deckel'. 25-31. Berlin: Springer. Carrier. M. 2006. Wi.",,,"schaftstheorie ~u,. Ei/!fiihrllllg. Hamburg: Junius. Carrier. M. 2008. "Knowledge is power." 01': How 10 capture the relations between science and technoscience. Manuscript. Cohen. H.F. 1994. The Scielllific Revolutioll: A His/o";ographica/illquiry. Chicago. IL: Chicago Press. Cohen.I.B. 1985. Revo/utioll ill Sciellce. Cambridge. MA: Belknap Press. Daum. A. 1998. Wissemdra!t.'popu/arisierllilg im 19. Jahrhulldert: bürgerliche KuIIU/; lIatUlwi." .,,,,,.'c/laft/iclle Bi/dullg ulld die delllsche 6.{fellllicllkeü. 1848-1914. München: Oldenbourg. Elzinga. A. 2004. The New Production of Particularism in Models Relating to Research Policy; A Critique of Mode 2 and Tripie Helix. Contribution to the 4S-EASST Conference. Paris. www.csi.ensmp.fr/WebCSI/4S/download-Pllper/download_paper.php?paper=elzinga.pdf. Accessed 21 August 2008. Etzkowitz. H .• and L. Leydesdorff. 1998. The endless translation: A Tripie Helix of university. industry-government relations. Millel1'a 36:271-288. Etzkowitz. H .. nnd L. Leydesdorff. 2000. The dynamics of innovation: From national systems and "Mode 2" to n tri pie helix of university-industry-government relations. Research Polh'V 29: 109-123. . Etzkowitz. H. 2004. The evolulion of theentrepreneurial university. IlIIematiolla/ Journa/ (!f Teclm%gy alld G/obalisatirm 1:64-77. 452 G. Schiemann Europliische Kommission. Generaldirektion Forschung. 200 I. Wissenschaft und Technik im Bewusstsein der Europfier: Eurobarometer 55.2. Brüssel. hllp:/lec.europa.eulpublic_opinionl archives/ebslebs_154_de.pdf. Accessed 21 August 2008. Forman. P. et al .. 2007. Responses to Forman. His"'ry and Tecllll%gy 23: 153-184. Fonnan. P. 2007. The primacy of science in modernity. of technology in postmodernity. and of ideology in the history of technology. History and Tedln%g)' 23: 1-152. Funtowicz. S.O .. und J.R. Ravetz. 1990. Uneel'taillry alld Qualiry in Sciellufol' Poliey. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Funtowicz. S.O .. and J.R. Ravetz. 1993. The emergence ofpost-normal science. In Sciellee. Po/itics and Mora/it.": Scielltiji(' Ulleertainty alld Decisiml Makillg. ed. R. von Schomberg. 85-123. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Funtowicz. S.O .. nnd J.R. Ravetz. 1994. Uncertainty, complexity nnd post-normal science. EIIl'immnellfa/ 7i1xic%g'y alld Clremi.",y 12: 1881-1885. Funtowicz. S.O .. and J.R. Ravetz. 2001. Post-normal science. Science and governance under conditions of complexity. In brterdi.tciplitmriry ill Tee/Ill%gy At.te.wnellf. /mp/emellfat;oll alld its ('lrall('e.t alld lim;ts. ed. M. Decker. 15-24. Berlin: Springer. Gibbons. M. et al .. 1994. Tlre Ne ... Pmduetioll of Kllowledge: Tlre DYllamie.t (~r Sciellce alld ResealY,1r ill COllfemporal)' Societie.t. London: Sage. Gibbons. M. et al .. 2003. Introduction: 'Mode 2' revisited: The new production of knowledge. Mill"/'1'a 41:179-194. Gross. M. et al.. 2005. Realexperimellfe: äktllogi.telre GestaltuIIgspmzesse ill der Wissell.tgesellsc!raft. Bielefeld: Transcripl. Hagner. M. (ed.). 2001. Allsicirtell der Wisullse/wf!.tge.tehicirte. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer. Hall. A.R. 1954. Tlre Sciellfijic Revolutioll 1500-1800: The Formatioll (!r tlre Modem Sciellfijil' Allit"de. London: Longmans. Green. Ihde. D.. and E. Selinger (eds.). 2003. Chasillg Teclll1o.teiellee: Matrix for Materiality. Bloomington. IN: Indiana Press. Jacob. M.C. 1997. Sciellt!{ie Culture alld tlre Makillg f!{tlre Illdustria/ We.tt. New York. NY: Oxford Press. Kline. R. 2007. Forman's Lament. Hi.ttory alld Tee/u/fIlogy 23: 160-166. Kourany. J.A. 2003. A philosophy of science for the twenty-first century. Plri/o,wplry (~r Science 70:1-14. Layton. E. 1971. Mirror-image twins: The communilies of science and technology in 19th-century Americn. Teclllwlogy and Culture 12:562-580. Manegold. K.-H. 1969. Zur Emallzipation der Techllik im 19. JahrlrulUfen ill Deutschland. München: Bruckmann. Nordmann. A. 2008. The age of techno-science. Manuscripl. Nowotny. H. et al .. 200 I. Re-thinkillg Sdence: Knowledge atld tlre Publie ill all Age of Uncertaim)'. Cambridge. MA: Polity Press. Nowotny. H. 1999. E.t ist so. Es k(jllllfe auch alldel:t sein: übel' da.t veränderte Verlrä/tnis von Wi.tscll.tchaft lind Gesell.tc/wft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Nowotny. H. 2006. Real science is excelJent science How to interpret post-academic science. Mode 2 and the ERC. Jouma/ trI Sciellce CmnmUl,ieatiml.t 5(4). hup:/ljcom.sissa.it. Accessed 21 August 2008. Reichle. I. 2004. Transgene Körper. Kunst im Zeitalter der Technoscience. www.muthesiusdmLde!reactlmedialM KN_ TransgeneKoerper.pdf. Accessed 21 August 2008. Schiemann. G. 1995. Am Ende der Endgültigkeit. Friedrich Enge.ls' Kritik des Gehungsanspruches der naturwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis. Sy.ttem ulld Struktur IIJ( I );83-98. Schiemann. G. 2008. We are not witnesses to a new scientific revolution. Manuscript. Schiemann. G. 2009. Hennallll VtJ/l Helmholtz '.t Meehalli.tm: Tlre Los.t ofCertaillry. A Study Oll the Trallsitiflll Imm Classical t(} Modem Philflsophy of Nature. Dordrecht: Springer. Schnfidelbach. H. 1983. Philosophie ill Deut.teh/arld 1831-1933. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Schurz. G. 2006. Eill{iilll'l/llg ill die Wis.tellScha.!tstheorie. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschafl. A Critique of the "Epochal-Break-Thesis" 45~ Shapin. S. 1998. Tlre Sciemijie Revoluti"n. Chicago, IL: Chicago Press. Skalweit. S. 1982. Der Begillll der Neuzeit: Epoelrellgrenze und E'JOelrenbegr!ff. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschafl. The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). 2000. Science and the puhlic: A review of science communication and public aUitudes to science in Britain. hUp:/lwww.welicorne. ac.uklstellent/groupslcorporatesite!@msh_pedaldocumentslweh_documentlwtdoõ419.pdf. Accessed 21 August 2008. Weber. J. 2003. Umkämnfte BedeutungeIl: Narllrkmlzepte im Zeiralterder Tee/mo.teiene<,. Frnnkl'urt am Main: Campus. Weingart. P. et al .. 2007. Nadlridlfen aus der Wissellsgesell.tclw.!t: Allaly.tell zur Veröndel'/mg der Wissen.tdw.!t. Weilerswist: VelbrUck. Weingart, P. 1997. From "finalization" to "Mode 2": Old wine in new boUles? Soeial Sdell('e lI,rormar;oll 36:591-613. Weingart. P. 2005. Die Wi.t.tell.tc!wf! der Of{ellfliehkeit: E.t.wl'.t ZIIm Verhälfllis VOll Wi.uell.telraft. Mediell IIl1d o,ffellflidtkeit. Weilerswist: VelbrUck. . . Wengenroth. U. 2oõ. Science. technology, and industry. In FlYJm Natural Phi/o.wphy tfl tll(' Sciellces. Writillg tlre Histflry (!r Nilleteellflr-CellfUlY Sciellce. ed. D. Cahnn. 221-253. Chicngo. IL: Chicago Press. Ziman. J. 2000. Real SeieIlce: What It Is. alld Wlrar It Meall.t. Cambridge. MA: Cambridge Press. BOSTON STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Editors ROBERT S. COHEN, Boston University JÜRGEN RENN. Max Planck Institute/or the History 0/ Science KOSTAS GAVROGLU, University 0/ Athens Editorial Adl'isol)' Board THOMAS F. GUCK, Boston Unil'ersity A DOLF GRÜNBAUM, Unil'ersity 0/ Pirrsburgh SYLVAN S. SCHWEBER, Brandeis University JOHN J. STACHEL, Boston University MARX W. WARTOFSKYt, (Editor /960-/997) VOLUME274 For further volumes: hllp:/lwww.springer.com/series/571 0 SCIENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF APPLICATION Edited by MARTIN CARRIER and ALFRED NORDMANN ~ Springer Editors Prof. Marlin Carrier Bielefeld University Department 01' Philosophy Institute ror Science und Technology Studies 3350 I Biclefeld Germany Illart i n.carrier@uni-bielefeld.de ISSN 0068-0346 Prof. Alfred Nordmann Darmstadt Technical University Department of Philosophy 64283 Darmstadt Germany nordmann@phil.tu-darmstadt.de ISBN 978-90-481-9050-8 e-ISBN 978-90-481-9051-5 DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-9051-5 Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg London New York Library of Congress Control Number: 2010934513 © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011 No pan of this work may he reproduced. stored in a retrieval system. or transmitted in any form or by any mcans. electronic. mechanical. pholocopying. microfilming. recording or olherwise. without wriUen pennission from Ihe Publisher. with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose nf being entered and executed on a computer system. for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Prinled nn acid-free paper Springer is pan of Springer Scicnce+Business Media (www.springer.com)